Further considerations of the question of free will
Whether the Universe is deterministic or not, it still seems odd to speak of free will. So the usual arguments go: Things happen with causes? We are defined by the causes which created us. Things happen without causes? Will is arbitrary and random.
Neither satisfies what we would consider a meaningful definition of free will.
But implicit in both schemas (a word not unlike "agendas" in being hyper-pluralized-- a superset of supersets) is a tacit materialism, and deeper than this, a tacit denial of the subjective reality.
What do I mean by this? We as conscious selves have the remarkable capacity to imagine. To hypothesize. We can consider how things "might have been."
Now, if the Universe is deterministic (as I'm inclined to suppose that it is), "might have been" is a strange concept. If all is defined by causes, there is no other way that the Universe could ever have been. We couldn't really make a different choice than the one we did.
But that does not mean that we didn't make a choice. This seems contradictory, but in fact need not be.
As conscious selves, we have the power to consider consequences. We can ask what would happen if we did A, even if we end up doing B.
In fact, this is crucially entwined with our capacity to reason (as we all suspected that free will would be). Reason--especially deductive reason--is in large part an understanding of the hypothetical. If P, then Q. That's not to say that P is true or Q is true, merely that if P is true, Q must be as well.
Physics (and by extension, the objective Universe) doesn't operate this way. The laws of physics are formulated this way, but that's misleading. The laws of physics in mathematical form are hypothetical extensions (created by conscious selves) of empirical facts. The Universe doesn't say, "well, since this electron is 2 nanometers from this proton, there better be an electrostatic attraction of 1.8e-32 newtons between them," there simply is an electrostatic attraction of 1.8e-32 newtons between them. The Universe couldn't imagine any other way.
But we could. We can imagine a Universe with totally different hypothetical laws, one utterly unlike anything we have ever empirically seen. We can imagine scenarios that may never happen, and bind them by as few or as many hypothetical rules as we see fit (it's called reasoning).
And so, when we make choices, what we do is weigh hypothetical alternatives subjectively to decide our physically objective action. From oughts and ifs within us we create an is.
That is may be determined (and so may be the oughts and ifs), but that doesn't change the fact that we are fundamentally different from the thoughtless and automatic electron.
How billions of electrons get together to make us remains to be seen, of course. But we do exist (I do, anyway; don't know about all you zombies), and we're fairly confident that electrons do too, and that our brains and bodies are made up of electrons, and that we can interact with our brains and bodies. So somehow the two must be related. How is not an easy question.
Neither satisfies what we would consider a meaningful definition of free will.
But implicit in both schemas (a word not unlike "agendas" in being hyper-pluralized-- a superset of supersets) is a tacit materialism, and deeper than this, a tacit denial of the subjective reality.
What do I mean by this? We as conscious selves have the remarkable capacity to imagine. To hypothesize. We can consider how things "might have been."
Now, if the Universe is deterministic (as I'm inclined to suppose that it is), "might have been" is a strange concept. If all is defined by causes, there is no other way that the Universe could ever have been. We couldn't really make a different choice than the one we did.
But that does not mean that we didn't make a choice. This seems contradictory, but in fact need not be.
As conscious selves, we have the power to consider consequences. We can ask what would happen if we did A, even if we end up doing B.
In fact, this is crucially entwined with our capacity to reason (as we all suspected that free will would be). Reason--especially deductive reason--is in large part an understanding of the hypothetical. If P, then Q. That's not to say that P is true or Q is true, merely that if P is true, Q must be as well.
Physics (and by extension, the objective Universe) doesn't operate this way. The laws of physics are formulated this way, but that's misleading. The laws of physics in mathematical form are hypothetical extensions (created by conscious selves) of empirical facts. The Universe doesn't say, "well, since this electron is 2 nanometers from this proton, there better be an electrostatic attraction of 1.8e-32 newtons between them," there simply is an electrostatic attraction of 1.8e-32 newtons between them. The Universe couldn't imagine any other way.
But we could. We can imagine a Universe with totally different hypothetical laws, one utterly unlike anything we have ever empirically seen. We can imagine scenarios that may never happen, and bind them by as few or as many hypothetical rules as we see fit (it's called reasoning).
And so, when we make choices, what we do is weigh hypothetical alternatives subjectively to decide our physically objective action. From oughts and ifs within us we create an is.
That is may be determined (and so may be the oughts and ifs), but that doesn't change the fact that we are fundamentally different from the thoughtless and automatic electron.
How billions of electrons get together to make us remains to be seen, of course. But we do exist (I do, anyway; don't know about all you zombies), and we're fairly confident that electrons do too, and that our brains and bodies are made up of electrons, and that we can interact with our brains and bodies. So somehow the two must be related. How is not an easy question.
posted by PNRJ at 17:20
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